# Patterns of religiosity among new immigrants from Turkey and Poland in Germany*

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The religiosity of immigrants is receiving increasing attention among scholars of migration and integration. In Western Europe, given on-going controversies over the public accommodation of Islam, most debates focus upon Muslim immigrants and their children for whom religious difference often constitutes a "bright" boundary (Alba 2005). In addition to a highly developed qualitative literature on individual styles, organizational forms, and political mobilization of Islam (for an early review see Tezcan 2003), a number of quantitative studies have more recently analyzed inter-generational changes in religiosity and their interrelation with structural integration outcomes across countries (for review see Voas/Fleischmann 2012).

However, empirical evidence continues to be inconclusive on a number of questions. Thus, whereas some studies have found Muslim religiosity to decline from the first to the second generation (on the Netherlands see Maliepard et al. 2010; Phalet et al. 2008; on Belgium see Smits et al. 2010), others point to greater stability of religiosity (on Germany Diehl/Koenig 2009). Some suggest that in contexts with strong institutional closure against Islam Muslim religiosity is negatively related with structural integration, while this relation does not seem to hold in more accommodative contexts (Fleischmann/Phalet 2011). Yet other studies find public hostility toward immigrants to be a contextual factor directly affecting the intensity of Muslim religiosity (Connor 2010). Perhaps the most important limitation of existing quantitative studies is that by selecting Muslim immigrants groups only they fail to put their religious characteristics into comparative perspective with other religious groups, notably Christian who, after all, constitute about 60% of the non-European immigrant population within Western Europe (see Pew Research Centre 2012: 52). The very few studies that do analyze integration trajectories across different religious groups (Tubergen/Sridottir 2011,

Aleksysnka/Algan 2010: 27) typically suffer from small subsample size and limited measures of religiosity.

In this paper we aim to contribute to the emerging literature on religion among immigrants in Europe by focusing on two religiously distinct groups, Turks and Poles in Germany. Both groups come from highly religious societies and thus share experiences of being exposed to the strongly secularized context of German society. However, both groups also differ considerably. Put briefly, Sunni Muslim Turks face a salient religious boundary in Germany while this is not the case for predominantly Catholic immigrants from Poland. Comparing both groups should thus provide further insights into the multifaceted dynamics of religiosity among immigrants.

Within the broader process of immigrant integration, our analytical focus is on changes in different migrant groups' religiosity immediately upon arrival. In fact, practically nothing is known about this initial period of immigrant integration in Europe. While the impact of the migratory event upon religion has been thoroughly studied in North America (Akresh 2011; Cadge/Ecklund 2006; Connor 2009a; Massey/Higgins 2010) and in Canada (Connor 2008; Connor 2009b), no data existed until recently to understand early dynamics of integration in Europe. Drawing on data from an international survey project on socio-cultural integration processes of new immigrants in Europe (SCIP) we present original empirical evidence on changes in religiosity in the very early period of integration among Turks and Poles in Germany.

We start by spelling out a number of theoretical arguments about potential changes in religiosity immediately following the migratory event (2.). We then provide some background information on Poles and Turks and Germany (3.) and describe the German SCIP dataset on which our analysis is based (4.). Presenting initial empirical findings from this dataset, we describe the religious profile of newly arriving Polish and Turkish migrants in Germany and

tentatively test theoretical arguments about the putative role of religiosity and religious participation in the very initial phase of immigrant integration (5.).

## 2. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS

Much of the current literature on the religiosity of immigrants is informed by classical theories of assimilation and secularization. Changes in religiosity from the first to the second generation are thus interpreted as evidence for broader assimilation trends, and in the Western European context these are seen as implying adaptation to secularizing trends among the majority population, although experiences of discrimination may prompt "reactive" returns to ethnic or religious identities (for review see Voas/Fleischmann 2012). A recurrent criticism in the literature has been, however, that theories of assimilation and secularization underspecify the social mechanisms that generate changing patterns of ethnic and religious orientations (see e.g. Esser 2006; Stolz 2009). This criticism is particularly relevant for newly arriving immigrants for whom behavioral changes have to be regarded as driven by social mechanisms operating in much shorter time spans than those typically addressed by assimilation or secularization theories. In the following section, we formulate a number of hypotheses on new migrants' religiosity that address the highly dynamic initial phase of integration upfront. We do so by drawing on existing empirical studies on the religiosity of newly arriving immigrants in North America and by building upon theoretical arguments that identify different factors impinging upon immigrants' religiosity.

A *first* line of argumentation regards the "uprooting" trauma of the migratory event as conducive to greater religiosity. Some migration scholars have even characterized migration as a "theologizing" experience (see Smith 1978: 1173). The crucial mechanism here is psychological; experiences of anomia or existential insecurity – such as the migratory event –

are regarded to potentially increase the receptivity to religious belief and meaning systems. Similarly, social-psychological theorists of social identity have argued that "critical transitions" such as the migratory event increase the salience of hitherto implicit or taken-for-granted identity categories (Hardin 2001), potentially including religious identities. The increasingly salient religious beliefs and identities, finally, may translate into active religious practice in religious communities providing Hirschman's (2004) famous three R's – refuge, respect and resources. Following this general line of argumentation, one would expect religiosity to rise from pre- to post-migration period. At the group level, one would furthermore expect the migratory event to be experienced as more disruptive, the greater the cultural and social distance between countries of origin and the receiving country. At the individual level, one would expect that the migratory event is experienced as more disruptive for those migrants who come without established social ties to the receiving country and who find themselves in situations of marked existential insecurity.

It could be argued, however, that the "theologizing" experience only holds for pioneer migrants, while for later newcomers religiosity is affected by the dynamics accompanying ethnic replenishment. A *second* line of argumentation therefore can be derived from more general theories of immigrant integration that unpack the mechanisms underlying processes of integration (see notably Esser 2006). These theories typically focus on immigrants' choice between ethnic group and receiving country orientations that potentially (but not necessarily) conflict with each other. As an investment in either ethnic group or receiving country options, immigrants' behavior is regarded as conditioned by ethnic group size, the strength of ethnic boundaries, and ethnic institutional completeness. Religiosity is in this view typically seen as an ethnic orientation and thus interlinked with ethnic network involvement more generally. Esser (2006), for instance, treats religious organizational involvement as an example for ethnic investments, following Breton (1964) whose original analysis of ethnic institutional

completeness found religious organizations to be of crucial importance for the maintenance of ethnic networks. For newcomers, the crucial mechanism generating patterns of religiosity is therefore not psychological but sociological, with involvement in already existing ethnic networks creating social incentives for religious involvement. At the most general level, the argument focuses not on increase but on potential decrease in religiosity, at least in the context of largely secularized societies; to the extent that receiving country options become more attractive than ethnic options, migrants would be expected to lose motifs for participation in religious communities. At the group level, one would assume religiosity to be a function of ethnic group size, ethnic boundaries and institutional completeness. And at the individual level, one would assume religiosity to remain stable among those migrants with strong social and identificational ties to the ethnic community; by contrast, migrants who build ties to members of the receiving society and assimilate in other spheres, e.g. structurally and cognitively, should be expected to adjust more rapidly to their secular environment.

A *third* and closely related line of argumentation emphasizes the transnational character of contemporary migration. Particularly for newcomers, the crucial investment decisions may actually pit receiving country orientations against transnational rather than against ethnic orientations; as long as migrants see their transition to the receiving society as temporary they have strong incentives of maintaining social ties and cultural attitudes that are perceived as relevant for their eventual return to the country of origin. Again, religious communities have been shown to be crucially linked with the maintenance of transnational ties (see e.g. Hagan/Ebaugh 2002; Levitt 2003). At the most general level, this argument would predict stability of religiosity. At the group level, religious stability should be linked with the strength of transnationalism among the respective migrant population. At the individual level, one would assume religiosity to decline among those migrants already determined to stay in the

receiving context, while migrants with strong transnational orientations should display stability in their religiosity.

All these three lines of argumentation, however, require further nuance with respect to various dimensions of religiosity. Indeed, the very early phase of the settlement process might be characterized be a substantial gap between subjective religiosity and actual religious participation. In newcomers' short-term calculus, participation in religious activities competes strongly with secular options such as finding home and job, learning a new language and establishing new networks (whether ethnic or not). Moreover, new immigrants often lack opportunities for religious involvement in terms of actual availability, and knowledge about, religious "supply". The three above-mentioned lines of argumentation therefore have to take into account that their respective predictions about increase, decrease, or stability of religiosity are conditional on existing opportunities, at least as far as religious participation is concerned.

## 3. COMPARING POLES AND TURKS IN GERMANY

At least some of the arguments laid out above have recently been addressed in studies based on immigrant survey data from the US and Canada. These studies have produced rather strong evidence for a decrease of worship attendance between pre- and post-migration period (Akresh 2011; Connor 2008, 2009a, 2009a; Massey/Higgins 2011; for a review of earlier studies see Mol 1979: 33).[1]

[1] One might consider that low levels of religiosity among new immigrants attest to the selectivity of immigrants who are among the religiously less embedded as compared to their compatriots (see Alanezi and Sherkat 2008); however, the consistent findings of self-rated retrospective religiosity and current religiosity suggest otherwise.

Such initial decrease of religiosity has furthermore been shown to be less pronounced among religious majority members (e.g. Catholics in Quebec) than among religious minority members (see Connor 2008); in line with supply-side theories of religious participation initial decrease is also mediated by the overall degree of religious diversity (Connor 2009). Overall, these studies lend strong support to the argument that opportunities for active religious participation matter in the short run, even when in the long run immigrants may adapt to the receiving society by attending worship more often (Akresh 2011).

However, these findings cannot a priori be generalized beyond the North American context with its rather pluralistic and vital religious field and its rather weak religious components in symbolic boundary configurations (Zolberg/Woon 1999; Connor/Koenig 2012). Therefore, we contribute to the literature by addressing the above mentioned arguments in the context of Western Europe where processes of secularization have been more pronounced while symbolic boundary configurations include religious differences notably vis-à-vis Islam. More specifically, we focus on new immigrants from Turkey and Poland in Germany.

Newcomers from Turkey and Poland experience a similar transition from a rather religious to a rather secular society in Germany. In fact, both countries are among the most highly religious countries in Europe. Recent ISSP data (2008), for instance, show that more than three quarters of the Turkish and Polish population, respectively, see themselves as somewhat, very or extremely religious; and figures of monthly or more worship attendance are around 50 per cent for both Poles and Turks. For both groups, there are thus strong reasons to expect that migration will prompt changes in religious identities, beliefs, and practices. In the following, we provide some more background information on both groups in order to further specify group-level hypotheses as implied in the above mentioned arguments.

First of all, newly arriving Turks and Poles obviously face very different kinds of symbolic boundaries given their respective religious background. Turks come from a predominantly

Sunni Muslim country and thus face rather strong public hostility toward Islam, while Poles are overwhelmingly Catholic and hence should experience less cultural distance. In light of the first argument about the anomic migratory event as a "theologizing" experience, one would thus expect that regardless of initial levels of religiosity one finds a greater increase of religiosity among Turks than among Poles in the initial phase of the integration process.

However, religion is evidently not the only dimension in which both newcomer groups differ. Indeed, contemporary immigrants coming from Turkey or Poland enter into rather distinctive trajectories of Germany's post-war history of immigration. There are now about 2.8 million German inhabitants with Turkish migration background. The pioneer migrants were predominantly male low skill labor migrants who came to fill the German economy's labor demand in the 1950s and 1960s. After the recruitment stop in 1973, family members came along and settled permanently in the Federal Republic; as of today, family is still the major migration motif among Turks (Migrationsbericht 2008: 206). By contrast, while it is true that large numbers of Polish workers had migrated to the German Empire during pre-World War I and some *Aussiedler* came during the 1980s, today's 630.000 or so persons with Polish migration background have mainly come during the post-communist period when they were allowed to enter as seasonal labor migrants (Migrationsbericht 2008: 37-38); it should be noted that despite Poland's EU accession Germany has removed legal barriers to free labor migration only by May 2011. As consequence of these different migration histories, contemporary newcomers from Turkey and Poland are confronted with different situation in terms of their ethnic group's size, strength of ethnic boundaries and ethnic institutional completeness. In line with the second argument derived from theories of immigrant integration, one would therefore expect Turks to find institutionally more complete ethnic religious institutions. On the individual level, we thus expect that for Turks more than for Poles, ethnic ties and identifications come along with a greater stability of religiosity.

As the third argument suggests, however, the ethnic group in the receiving society may not be the crucial reference group for newly arriving migrants who are embedded in more transnational networks. Given the circular character of seasonal labor migration from Poland as well geographical proximity, regular transnational involvement may be stronger among Poles than among Turks in Germany. Hence, one would expect religiosity to be more stable among newly arriving Poles as compared to Turks.

Finally, we need to take into account that given the majority status of Catholicism in at least some German cities, Poles should find a sufficiently developed religious opportunity structure so drops in religious participation induced by lack of actual or perceived religious supply should be less pronounced. Among Turks, there is also now a thriving religious field with strong inter-denominational competition, but given persisting difficulties in receiving zoning permits for mosque buildings, let alone equal recognition as religious corporations, religious supply is less easily available for Muslim Turks. The effect of actual or perceived religious supply on participation should thus be greater among Turks than among Poles; put differently, one would expect religious participation, at least initially, to decline among Turks simply because of limited opportunities.

## 4. DATA AND METHODS

To test the theoretical arguments among Poles and Turks in Germany, we draw on data from a unique dataset produced in an international survey project on socio-cultural integration processes among new immigrants in Europe (SCIP).[2] The SCIP project is a mini-panel study of selected migrant groups in which about 7.000 migrants aged between 18 and 60 are

[2] The SCIP project is funded by the NORFACE Research Programme on Migration and is coordinated by Claudia Diehl at the University of Göttingen.

surveyed in four European destination countries – Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Ireland. In this paper, we draw upon data from the first survey wave in Germany. Here, immigrants from Poland and Turkey having stayed in Germany up to 1.5 years were interviewed in Polish and Turkish CAPI-interviews in 2010/2011. Initially, a random sample was drawn from population registers in four cities (Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, and Munich); given reachability problems among newcomers, an additional random sample was drawn including a fifth city (Bremen). Ultimately, 2.697 interviews (1.516 among Poles; 1.181 among Turks) were conducted in the first wave.

Since we are interested in the religiosity of Muslim Turks and Catholic Poles, we limit our analysis to those who declare some religious affiliations. Thus, we exclude Poles and Turks who report having no religious affiliation whatsoever; furthermore we exclude those reporting another religious affiliation than Muslim or than Catholic, respectively. Our analysis is thus based on 1.343 Poles and 1.028 Turks.

To give an overall profile of the religiosity of both groups we rely on a number of variables from the questionnaire including worship attendance, prayer, fasting, self-declared religiosity, and identification with a broader religious community, e.g. Christianity or the Islamic ummah. Since all items for religiosity are highly correlated, we constructed an additive religiosity index (Cronbach's $\alpha = .746$). This index is used as dependent variable in a linear regression model in order to provide a basic profile of religiosity in relation to socio-demographic characteristics such as age, sex, and education (primary, secondary, tertiary) as well as some country of origin and receiving country related background variables.

Since our main analytical interest, however, is in (perceived) changes in religiosity after migration we rely on those religious items (worship attendance, prayer, fasting) that respondents were also asked retrospectively for the pre-migration period. In our modeling strategy we draw on existing studies from the US and Canada and refine them in a number of

ways. Some studies have attempted to predict post-migration religious participation by other variables known to affect religious practice, using pre-migration religious practice as an independent variable (Massey/Higgins 2011: 1385) or control variable (Akresh 2010: 654). This approach, however, provides only limited insight into the crucial question of pre-/post-migration change. As a rare attempt to focus more directly on the pre-/post-migration change, Connor (2008: 252; 2009: 793) models religious participation as a function of time. In our modeling, we follow the basic logic of his approach but adapt it to the dataset at hand. Thus, we created three dependent variables measuring changes in religious attendance, prayer, and fasting, respectively, by subtracting pre-migration from post-migration scores.

We operationalize our three core arguments with the following independent variables. To capture the existential insecurity on which the argument about migration as "theologizing" experience focuses, we include several indicators for anomia, i.e. living situation (alone vs. with others) and main activity (unemployed vs. other activities). Since the disruptive experience of migration may furthermore be greater for people migrating from rural contexts into large cities and for those without any prior first-hand knowledge in the receiving country, we also include indicators of rural vs. urban background and previous stays in Germany. Finally, we include a variable that measures dissatisfaction with the current living situation.

To directly capture the strong ethnic ties highlighted in the argument derived from assimilation research, we first include a variable distinguishing living alone from those living together with persons exclusively from the country of origin, exclusively from the receiving country, of both. Second, we include an indicator of close friendship networks (four closest friends) similarly distinguishing marginalized individuals without any friends from those who declare to have friends exclusively from country of origin, from receiving country, or both. The two independent variables thus capture four different kinds of social networks which in Berry's (1978) terminology may be labeled as marginalization, segregation, assimilation, and

integration. Furthermore, we include a detailed variable on main activity (in education, working, unemployed, retired).

The argument about the role of transnational orientations in maintaining religious beliefs, identities and practices is operationalized by including identification with country of origin, migration situation, and remittances. Identifying with the country of origin and sending remittances are straightforward indicators of migrants' transnational orientation; the same holds of migration situation, since those intending to return or to go back and forth between either Turkey or Poland and Germany on a regular basis should have more reason to maintain their religiosity than those already intending to stay in Germany.

In our modeling approach we start with a baseline model that includes the ethnic composition of neighborhood, length stay as well as a number of socio-demographic control variables and city of interview. To control for religious supply without which worship attendance would be impossible, we ideally would have information on the religious infrastructure in each given neighborhood. Absent such information, we use the subjectively perceived ethnic composition of the neighborhood as proxy for the availability of places of worship. We also include length of stay (in months) to capture potential differences in knowledge about existing religious supply. We then add indicators for the three theoretical mechanisms outlined above in order to gain first insight into whether new migrants' religiosity is a reaction to anomia and uprootedness, is part of a general process of assimilation versus ethnic maintenance, or reflects transnational living arrangements and orientations .

## 4. FINDINGS

We start with some descriptive information on the religiosity of new immigrants from Poland and Turkey in Germany (see table 1). Overall, the data confirm that Polish and Turkish

display relatively high levels of religiosity, although it should be stressed that both groups are somewhat less religious than comparable age groups in Poland and Turkey. Thus, while in the ISSP more than over 70 per cent of Poles and over 80 per cent of Turks in the age group between 20 and 40 describe themselves as somewhat, very or extremely religious, self-rated religiosity among recent newcomers from both countries figures at 66,8 and 53,9 per cent, respectively. This might be related to the fact that a majority of new immigrants, especially, among the Turks come from larger cities in the country of origin and are relatively well educated.

- Table 1 about here -

To give a more nuanced profile of religiosity among new Turkish and Polish immigrants, we present a regression model for the religiosity index as dependent variable (see table 2). The results demonstrate some difference in patterns of religiosity among both groups. Thus, among the Poles, older people and women are more religious, while among Turks, the opposite is the case. Partially, however, these differences can be explained by well-known gender-difference in religious attendance among Turks. It is also interesting to note that education has no effect among Poles, while among Turks the more educated tend to be less religious. More striking, in fact, are the similarities between both groups. Thus, the more religious people typically come from rural areas, have migrated for family reasons, are determined to return to their country of origin, and display higher identification with their country of origin.

We complete this descriptive overview by looking into the relationship between new migrants' religiosity and some indicators for their early adaptation patterns (language, perceptions of receiving society, social and structural assimilation). Surprisingly, few of these variables are correlated with the religiosity index. Among Poles, one does find a negative effect of strong friendship ties with Germans, but this is not the case among Turks. Overall, it

seems that in the initial period of migrant settlement, religiosity is more strongly linked with properties of the country of origin and less with the receiving country. It remains to be seen if the link between new migrants' and their integration in Germany remains diffuse or becomes stronger in the years to come.

- Table 2 about here -

Notwithstanding the potential selectivity in current religiosity patterns from Turkey and Poland, the descriptive data clearly indicates an aggregate decrease for all religious indicators where retrospective information is available. Contrary to the argument about existential insecurity, there is a pronounced decline in worship attendance, especially among Turks. Regular prayer also decreases, although to a much lesser degree than worship attendance. Fasting, e.g. during Lent or Ramadan, displays the sharpest drop; however this finding might be an artifact since at least some of the respondents, depending on their length of stay in Germany, may not yet have had the occasion to engage in this religious practice.

- Figure 1 about here -

To look into the changing pattern of religiosity among both groups, we now focus on religious attendance as our dependent variable. Since only very few respondents report an increase in religious attendance, we collapse stability and increase into one category. Our binary dependent variable thus pits stability/increase (1) against decrease (0). We start with the baseline model (table 3, model 1) that includes basic socio-demographic variables, city of interview as well as ethnic composition of the neighborhood and length of stay. While there seem to be no effects of sex and age upon change in religious practice, we find statistically significant effects of education for both Turks and Poles; those with post-secondary education seem to experience less of a decline in religious attendance (b=.530 for Turks; b=.469 for Poles), but it should be noted that this group already has lower levels religious attendance on

average (see table 2). Among Turks, we find that length of stay has a positive effect upon stability in religious attendance (b=0,26); put differently, it seems that at least parts of the decline in religious attendance can be attributed to initial drops which may result from lacking knowledge about religious supply. By contrast, the neighborhood composition as proxy for religious supply has no significant effect. On the whole, the baseline model does not fit the data very well (Pseudo $r^2$=0.028 for Turks; Pseudo $r^2$=.030 for Poles).

Adding variables that capture existential insecurity (model 2) does not substantially increase model fit (Pseudo $r^2$ = .037 for Turks; Pseudo $r^2$= .036 for Poles). Neither coming from rural background, nor living alone, migrating without preexisting ties to Germany, being unemployed nor dissatisfaction with the current situation seem to account for the pattern of religious change; for Turks, in line with the argument of existential insecurity, living alone seems to stabilize religious attendance (b=.344), but contrary to this argument migrants from rural background experience even greater decline in religious attendance (b=-.131). This overall finding should not come as a surprise since the argument about existential insecurity did not find any support in aggregate perspective.

- Table 3 about here -

Moving to the argument about ethnic maintenance versus assimilation (model 3), the inclusion of detailed variables of main activity, household constellation and friendship network does fit the data somewhat better than the model focusing on anomia (Pseudo $r^2$=.049 for Poles; Pseudo $r^2$ = .051 for Turks) but the correlations are somewhat puzzling. Among Poles, in particular, living together exclusively with Germans significantly reduces religious attendance, while the other variables do not have statistically significant effects. The same effect of living in a household with majority members only can be found among Turks. However, Turkish newcomers having strong friendship ties only with people born in Germany seem to experience greater stability in their religious practice; it could be, however, that this is

due to the fact that these friends are in fact second generation Turks who can be expected to already have access to religious networks in Germany. In sum, there is only limited evidence for the second theoretical argument, that religious decline comes along with some sort of social assimilation.

In the final model, we therefore include additional variables that not just ethnic ties in general but transnational involvement in particular (model 4). For Poles, this only marginally increases the explained variance (Pseudo $r^2$=.055), with none of the variables showing any significant effects. For Turks, however, the new model provides to show additional insights (Pseudo $r^2$ = .071). Both identification with country of origin and remittances have significant effects. Surprisingly, though, the direction of the effect is contrary to expectations; the greater Turkish migrants' identification with Turkey and the more they send remittances to their homes, the higher the probability to experience a decrease in religious attendance between pre- and post-migration period. Vis-à-vis these puzzling findings the most interesting result of this exercise is maybe that there is a stable positive effect, albeit marginally significant and of small magnitude, for months since migration *only* for Turks. This suggests that unlike Catholic Poles – who can find a religious infrastructure in Germany – Turks experience not only greater religious decline after immigration but also show a pattern of resuming religious activities over time. Contacts to second generation Turks seem to play an important role in this regard.

## 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have analyzed patterns of religiosity after the migratory event among recent immigrants from Poland and Turkey in Germany. This is the first study to address questions of religious changes after the migratory event in Western Europe; it thus contributes to the

existing literature by moving beyond the North American context and exploring dynamics of religious change among two distinctive immigrant groups in a Western Europe context.

We find rather limited support for the major arguments advanced in the literature. The argument about migration as "theologizing" experience received no support whatsoever. Both Turks and Poles experience a decline, not an increase in religiosity after the migratory event, and this decline is not limited to religious participation and thus cannot simply be explained by a lack of opportunities for religious participation. Furthermore, individual-level variables measuring existential insecurity did not even turn out to stabilize, if not increase religious practice. It seems that this argument, while potentially relevant for pioneer migrants, is irrelevant for subsequent cohorts of immigrants. More support is found for the argument derived from theories of immigrant integration; being exposed to the more secular context in Germany, immigrants participate less in religious worship. Moreover, among both Poles and Turks, living in a household with Germans only appears to contribute to decline in religious practice. The variables measuring transnational ties seem to contribute to explaining differences in religious change. Surprisingly, though, it seems the greater transnational ties are related to greater decline in religiosity among Turkish newcomers. At this point, we can only speculate about the reasons for this finding; it could be, for instance, that Turks with strong orientations to Turkey feel at odds with the Muslim religious field as it has developed in Germany over the past decades; forced by German governmental initiatives, mosque communities or previously rivaling organizations such as DITIB, the Turkish state's religious bureaucratic arm in Germany, and those from political Islamic movements such as Milli Görüs have willy-nilly started co-operating (Laurence 2012; Schiffauer 2009); there are also signs of increased inter-ethnic composition of mosque communities. It could be that newcomers from Turkey with strong orientations toward their home country feel at odds with these new German forms of Islam.

However, overall, it still remains unclear how exactly processes of social and structural integration are related to the early trajectory of religious change; the second wave of the SCIP project therefore promises to yield further insights into the dynamics of religious change in the initial period of immigrant integration.

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**Table 1: Distribution of model variables, Polish Catholics and Turkish Muslims (means)**

| | Poles | | Turks | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Dependent variables** | CO | RC | CO | RC |
| Religious participation (1=never; 7=once a week) | 4.75 | 3.40 | 4.01 | 2.47 |
| Religious practice: praying (1=never; 6=every day/several times a day) | 3.79 | 3.50 | 3.19 | 2.68 |
| Religious practice: fasting (1=never; 5=always) | 3.15 | 1.53 | 3.76 | 1.72 |
| Religious belief (1=not religious at all; 4=very religious) | | 2.71 | | 2.56 |
| Religious identities | | 2.93 | | 2.85 |
| Index Religiosity RC (1=not religious, 5=very religious)* | | 3.47 | | 2.84 |
| **Independent variables** | | | | |
| Female | .45 | | .49 | |
| Age | 33 | | 28 | |
| Education (1=primary, 3=tertiary) | 2.07 | | 2.13 | |
| Share CO members neighborhood (1=(almost)none; 5=(almost)all) | | 2,04 | | 2,41 |
| Months since immigration | | 8,62 | | 7,37 |
| Migration motive: *Work* | | .68 | | .07 |
| Education | | .07 | | .66 |
| Marriage | | .16 | | .09 |
| Joined or followed family | | .15 | | .18 |
| Political or other reasons | | .08 | | .03 |
| Background CO (1=urban, 5=country house) | 2.58 | | 1.79 | |
| Previous stays in RC | .46 | | .18 | |
| Migration situation: stay in RC | | .25 | | .45 |
| move back and forth | | .25 | | .21 |
| return to CO | | .44 | | .30 |
| move to third country | | .06 | | .04 |
| Lives: alone | | .20 | | .20 |
| with CO born only | | .34 | | .32 |
| with RC born only | | .10 | | .34 |
| with CO and RC born | | .36 | | .20 |
| Main activity: working | | .65 | | .22 |
| in full time education | | .16 | | .27 |
| unemployed | | .08 | | .31 |
| looking after home/parental leave | | .08 | | .13 |
| else (retired, sick, disabled, missing) | | .03 | | .08 |
| Soc. integration: no friends | | .37 | | .29 |
| RC born friends only | | .07 | | .10 |
| CO born friends only | | .43 | | .35 |
| RC and CO friends | | .13 | | .26 |
| Language skills (1=not at all, 5=very well) | | 2.87 | | 2.57 |
| Plans to: stay in RC | | .25 | | .45 |
| move back and forth | | .25 | | .21 |
| return to CO | | .44 | | .30 |
| move to 3rd country | | .06 | | .04 |
| Sends remittances | | .41 | | .17 |
| Identification with CO (1=not important at all, 4=very important) | 3.39 | | 3.48 | |
| Perceived value compatibility (1=low, 5=high) | | 3.21 | | 2.64 |
| Current situation compared with CO (1=much better, 5=much worse) | | 3.21 | | 2.64 |

Source: SCIP Project, own calculations.

* Additive Index Religiosity based on median split: religious practice (praying in RC), religious identity, religious belief, religious participation (in RC), Cronbach's Alpha=.731.

+ Social integration calculated on basis of country of birth.

**Table 2: A Profile of Polish Catholics and Turkish Muslims arriving in Germany (OLS regression, unstandardized coefficients)**

| | **Poles** (N=1,257) | | **Turks** (N=905) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1 | Model 2 |
| **Dependent Variable** | | | | |
| Index Religiosity RC: 1=not religious, 5=very religious | | | | |
| **Independent Variables** | | | | |
| Female | .23** | .26** | -.35*** | -.37*** |
| Age | .02*** | .02*** | -.01* | -.02** |
| Education: *primary* | | | | |
| secondary | .06 | .12 | -.27* | -.20 |
| tertiary | .08 | .15 | -.60*** | -.46** |
| Rural background | .25*** | .26*** | .12** | .09** |
| Migration motive: *Work* | | | | |
| Education | .13 | .21 | -.96*** | -.78** |
| Marriage | .44** | .45** | -.01 | -.07 |
| Joined or followed family | .22** | .24* | .48** | .48 |
| Political or other reasons | -.01 | .00 | .15 | .22 |
| Previous stays in RC | .06 | .09 | .03 | .09 |
| Plans to: stay in RC | | | | |
| move back and forth | .25** | .22* | .20* | .17 |
| return to CO | .23** | .17 | .54*** | .47*** |
| move to 3rd country | .10 | .08 | .06 | .00 |
| Identifies with CO | .42*** | .42*** | .29*** | .27*** |
| | | | | |
| Segregated neighborhood | | .09 | | .00 |
| Main activity: *working* | | | | |
| in full time education | | .05 | | -.37** |
| unemployed | | -.12 | | -.05 |
| looking after home/ parental leave | | .04 | | .26 |
| else (retired, sick, disabled, missing) | | -.24 | | .21 |
| Language skills (1=not at all, 5=very well) | | .01 | | -.04 |
| Perceived value compatibility (1=low, 5=high) | | .01 | | -.06 |
| Soc. integration: marg. | | | | |
| RC born friends only | | -.38** | | -.05 |
| CO born friends only | | .11 | | .34** |
| RC and CO friends | | .01 | | .21 |
| *Constant* | .229 | -.199 | 2.737*** | 3.172*** |
| $R^2$ | .126 | .137 | .185 | .210 |

**Figure 1: Religious Change after Migration, Polish Catholics and Turkish Muslims**



**Table 3: Which factors influence stability in religious participation? Polish Catholics and Turkish Muslims (Logistic Regression)**

| | **Poles** (N=1,257) | | | | **Turks** (N=957) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Basic | Anomia | Assimilation | +TN | Basic | Anomia | Assimilation | +TN |
| **Dependent Variable** | | | | | | | | |
| 1=stability or increase in religiosity, 0=decline | | | | | | | | |
| **Independent Variables** | | | | | | | | |
| Female | -.02 | -.01 | .07 | .04 | .14 | .17 | .17 | .22 |
| Age | .01 | .01 | .01* | .01* | -.01 | -.01 | -.01 | -.02 |
| Education: *primary* | | | | | | | | |
| secondary | .39** | .38** | .32** | .36** | .09 | .02 | .01 | -.10 |
| tertiary | .47** | .46** | .45** | .48** | .53** | .34 | .33 | .24 |
| Months since immig. | -.01 | -.01 | .00 | .00 | .03* | .03* | .03* | .03* |
| Segregated neighbor. | .03 | .03 | .03 | .09 | -.05 | -.02 | -.02 | -.03 |
| City: *Berlin* | | | | | | | | |
| Cologne | -.26 | -.29* | -.32* | -.28 | .16 | .12 | .21 | .20 |
| Hamburg/ Bremen | .50** | .49** | .42* | .58** | .10 | .13 | .11 | .27 |
| Munich | .46** | .42** | .47** | .52** | -.4** | -.48* | -.51* | -.4** |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **Anomia** | | | | | | | | |
| Lives alone | | .13 | | | | .34* | | |
| Rural background | | .02 | | | | -.13** | | |
| Prior stays in RC | | .17 | | | | -.19 | | |
| Situation: worse in RC | | -.04 | | | | -.04 | | |
| Unemployed | | -.04 | | | | .03 | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **Assimilation** | | | | | | | | |
| Lives: *alone* | | | | | | | | |
| with RC born only | | | -.93*** | -1.1*** | | | -.45* | -.37 |
| with CO born only | | | -.04 | -.10 | | | -.40 | -.28 |
| with RC and CO born | | | .09 | .11 | | | -.06 | -.09 |
| Main activity: *working* | | | | | | | | |
| in full time education | | | .27 | .25 | | | .10 | -.10 |
| unemployed | | | .02 | -.01 | | | -.05 | -.13 |
| looking after home | | | -.15 | -.12 | | | -.25 | -.34 |
| else | | | .60 | .49 | | | -.39 | -.56* |
| Soc. integration: marg. | | | | | | | | |
| RC born friends only | | | .23 | .29 | | | .54** | .47* |
| CO born friends only | | | -.07 | .01 | | | -.10 | -.07 |
| RC and CO friends | | | .03 | .17 | | | .14 | -.17 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **Transnat. Orientations** | | | | | | | | |
| Plans to: *stay in RC* | | | | | | | | |
| move back and forth | | | | -.10 | | | | -.01 |
| return to CO | | | | -.17 | | | | .11 |
| move to 3rd country | | | | .05 | | | | .46 |
| Identifies with CO | | | | -.02 | | | | -.3** |
| Remits | | | | -.12 | | | | -.4** |
| *Constant* | -.837 | -.870 | -1.049* | -1.055 | -.340 | -.325 | -.110 | 1.100 |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | .030 | .032 | .049 | .055 | .028 | .037 | .051 | .071 |