Children as Barriers to Repartnering in Five National Contexts

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Abstract

This work examined what role children play in the repartnering process in five European countries (Norway, France, Germany, Romania, and Russia) by addressing the following research questions: (1) To what extent do men and women differ in their repartnering chances?; (2) Can gender differences in repartnering be explained by the presence of children?; (3) How do the custodial arrangements and the child's age affect the repartnering chances of men and women? We used data from the first wave of the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS; United Nations, 2005) to examine the transition to a cohabiting relationship following the dissolution of the first marital union, separately for men and women. The story which emerged was dominated by similarities in the effects across the countries rather than differences. In most countries, children were women's main barrier on the repartnering market, with childless women being no less likely to repartner than childless men; parenthood affected women's but not men's chances to repartner; coresidential children decreased mothers' but not fathers' likelihood to enter a new cohabiting union; and finally, as children aged, women's chances to repartner improved. These findings are discussed in light of possible reduced attractiveness to potential new partners, as well as, fewer opportunities to meet such partners.

Keywords: children, custody, divorce, gender differences, repartnering

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1 Introduction

The steady rise in divorce rates across Western countries has made researchers progressively more interested in understanding the possible subsequent transition to a new marital or cohabiting union. In this work, we focus on what role children might play in the repartnering process in five European countries (Norway, France, Germany, Romania, and Russia) by addressing the following research questions: (1) To what extent do men and women differ in their repartnering chances?; (2) Can gender differences in repartnering be explained by the presence of children?; (3) How do the custodial arrangements and the child's age affect the repartnering chances of men and women?

The entrance into a new partnership following a marital dissolution is important because of its potential to counteract some of the documented negative effects which divorce can have. For example, though divorced men and women generally report lower adjustment than their married counterparts (for an overview, see Amato, 2000), the presence of a new romantic partner has been shown to be positively correlated with adult wellbeing (e.g., Wang & Amato, 2000). Furthermore, divorce has been found to result in substantial financial decline for women in particular (e.g., Ongaro, Mazzuco, & Meggiolaro, 2009; Poortman, 2000), which however, can be offset by a remarriage (e.g., Dewilde & Uunk, 2008; for an overview, see Sweeney, 2010).

Empirical evidence suggests that the majority of divorcees repartner (for an overview, see Coleman, Ganong, & Fine, 2000; Sweeney, 2010) with a probably stronger preference for cohabitation over remarriage (Wu & Schimmele, 2005). Yet, this likelihood to repartner and the time between divorce and new partnership can vary greatly between individuals (Coleman et al.,

2000) and researchers have tried to understand the factors which facilitate or impede this transition.

Earlier work has shown that the presence of children can complicate the process of repartnering with divorced parents being less likely to form a (marital or cohabiting) relationship than divorcees without children (e.g., Bumpass, Sweet, & Castro Martin, 1990; Koo, Suchindran, & Griffith, 1984; Teachman & Heckert, 1985). However, children have been shown to affect women's and men's chances to repartner somewhat differently (e.g., Coleman et al., 2000; de Graaf & Kalmijn, 2003; Meggliolaro & Ongaro, 2008; Poortman, 2007; Skew, Evans, & Gray, 2009; Wu et al., 2005). Previous work has generally demonstrated that the presence of children has a negative effect on women's likelihood to repartner. The effects have been shown to vary somewhat according to the number and ages of the children with younger children and having more than two children resulting in even lower likelihood to repartner (e.g., de Graaf et al., 2003; Koo et al., 1984; Lampard & Peggs, 2003; Meggiolaro et al., 2008; Poortman, 2007; Skew, Evans, & Gray, 2009; Sweeney, 2002; Wu et al., 2005).

The findings with respect to men's chances are less clear. Work from the United States has shown that men's chances to form a new union are not affected by the presence of resident children and are even increased by nonresident children (Stewart, Manning, & Smock, 2003). Empirical work in Canada has also shown that young children improve men's chances to enter a cohabiting union (Wu et al., 2005). Some European studies have also shown that co-resident children increase men's chances of forming a union with a non-parent (Bernhardt & Goldscheider, 2002) whereas others have not found this positive effect of children on men's repartnering chances (e.g., de Graaf et al., 2003; Poortman, 2007). In light of these mixed findings, it has been noted that it is important to also consider that the process of repartnering can be affected by the macro-level context in which it occurs (Meggliolaro et al., 2008; Mills, 2004).

In this study, we follow in this line of research by investigating how the presence of children (including their post-separation residence and age) can affect men's and women's chances to repartner. Our main contribution to this literature is that we can provide an impression to what extent this "children as barriers" effect is universal across five European countries which are rather distinct in their institutional contexts (Norway, France, Germany, Romania, and Russia). We use recently collected data from the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS; United Nations, 2005). The GGS data are unique in that they contain cross-comparative partner and parenthood history data for a number of (primarily) European countries. We replicate earlier work on the effect of children on repartnering and build upon it by using comparable data and analyses across the five countries. Furthermore, we are able to address in further detail the issue of how children's residence and ages can affect not only women's chances to repartner (which has been the focus of many of the earlier works) but also men's likelihood to establish a new union after divorce.

2 Why can children affect repartnering after divorce?

To understand why children might be an important element in the repartnering process, we need to consider three important factors which affect people's initiation of a new union: need, attractiveness, and opportunity (Becker, 1991; de Graaf et al., 2003; Goldscheider & Waite, 1986; Oppenheimer, 1988). On the one hand, people with children might have a higher need and thus, incentive to repartner after experiencing a divorce than divorcees without dependent children. As previously mentioned, women's economic situation in particular is adversely affected by the dissolution of a marital union (Ongaro et al., 2009; Poortman, 2000) which can be especially problematic for those with dependent children. This need is likely highest when the children are young and / or reside at home and thus, limit the ability to participate fully in the labor market. This need argument is probably not as applicable to men as divorce tends not have the same repercussions for their economic situation as for women (Poortman, 2000). In other words, according to this argument, women with children should be *more* likely to repartner after divorce than women without children. Yet, as previously elaborated, research does not necessarily support this expectation (Coleman et al., 2000). It is also important to consider that both men and women with children might be less interested in entering a second union because their desire to be a parent has already been met in the first union (Meggliolaro et al., 2008).

Another way in which children might affect one's repartnering chances is by a decrease in the person's attractiveness to potential new partners. The presence of children from a previous union means that the new partner will have to make an investment in a relationship with non-biological offspring and to potentially act as a stepparent, a role which has been found to be at times problematic (Stewart et al., 2003). This consideration might be particularly strong in the case of resident children though it might be less challenging if the child is young when the new partner enters the household (for an overview of stepparent-child relations, see Cherlin & Furstenberg, 1994). Here, it is also important to note that children might affect men's and women's attractiveness to potential partners differently. Studies on mate-selection preferences have shown that women are consistently more willing than men to form a union with someone who has children (South, 1991). This can be interpreted as a so called "good father effect" where a man's attractiveness to potential partners is increased by his involvement in the lives of his children. Such parental commitment on part of the man is essentially testifying to his willingness to provide for his offspring. However, the same probably does not apply to women because their involvement in child-rearing is seen as highly normative and is thus, not necessarily additionally “rewarded” on the remarriage market.

Finally, children might affect the probability of repartnering because of the constraints that children put on the opportunities to meet a new partner. Due to heightened caring obligations, young and resident children are particularly likely to reduce the time and energy that custodial parents can spend on leisure activities and on socializing with potential new partners (Koo et al., 1984). Additionally, children can actively oppose their parents’ dating and possible repartnering (Koo et al., 1984). It is also important to note here that though children have been shown to impact both men’s and women’s social networks, these changes tend to be gender specific; whereas fathers mostly temporarily increase the kin composition of their social network after the birth of a child, for women, having children results in a reduction in the size of the social network and the volume of contacts (Munch, McPherson, & Smith-Lovin, 1997). The restricted opportunities to meet and mate might also be especially strong in so far as children reduce labor force participation as work has been shown to be the most important place to meet new partners in the remarriage market (de Graaf et al., 2003).

In line with the arguments outlined above, in this paper we re-examine the effects of children on repartnering for men and women. Firstly, we investigate if women have lower chances of repartnering after marital separation. In line with previous work, we expect to find a lower likelihood of repartnering for women compared to men. However, we then consider if children are women’s main barrier on the repartnering market. To do so we examine the transition to a new cohabiting union only for the people without children from their ex-partner. If children are indeed the main barrier for women in repartnering, we expect to find that gender does not play a significant role in predicting childless people's transition to next union. Subsequently, we examine the possible children effect in detail. First, we examine how the effect of children on repartnering differs between men and women. Subsequently, we make a distinction between (only) nonresident children and never having had any children. In other words, we examine if there is a certain "parenthood effect" on repartnering for men and women (due the outlined "attractiveness" argument) or whether it is indeed children's residence that affects the chances of forming a new union (due to a reduction in opportunities, for example). In line with previous work in the European context (e.g., de Graaf et al., 2003; Poortman, 2007), we expect to find a negative effect of parenthood on repartnering for both men and women (with stronger effects for women). We then expect to find that it is coresidential children that are most detrimental to the likelihood of forming a new union. Finally, we examine how the age of the youngest child affects repartnering. Here, we make a distinction between the effect of age while the child is still highly dependent on his or her parents (i.e., before the age of 18) and after this transition. The general expectation is that the more dependent the child is (i.e., younger and before the age of 18), the less attractive the parents are to potential new partners and the fewer chances they have to meet such partners. Therefore, we expect to see a positive effect of the child's age on the chances of repartnering. However, once the child reaches the age of majority, we expect to no longer see a significant effect of age because of the increase in autonomy and thus, decrease in parental responsibilities.

3 Can the effect of children on repartnering be modified by country characteristics?

Though the question of how children can affect the transition to a second union has been addressed before, the majority of that researcher focuses on women and on the North American context (Bernhardt et al., 2002). Yet, an argument can be made that the needs, attractiveness, and opportunities of divorced parents might be modified by the cultural, normative, and institutional contexts in which they are embedded. Therefore, in our work, we explore to what extent the effect of children on men's and women's chances to repartner is universal. We focus on five countries: Norway, France, Germany, Romania, and Russia. These are chosen because they vary in the risk of poverty for single parents with dependent children (thus, affecting the financial need to repartner), in the degree to which divorce is common in the country (which can affect the attractiveness of divorced parents), and in the extent to which they provide caring support to parents with young children (e.g., public day care) and the attitudes towards using these services (which can affect the opportunities to meet new partners). Though we outline these variations in the subsequent section, we do not aim to present an exhaustive exploration of the child related policies and practices in each country. Rather, this overview is meant to help contextualize the repartnering process.

According to data presented by Eurostat (2012), the risk of poverty in 2007 (operationalized as having income after social transfers which is below the poverty threshold) for single people living with at least one dependent child was highest in Romania, followed by Germany, Norway, and France. As for Russia, though no comparative work is available, previous findings indicate that single-parent households in the Russian Federation are more likely to be persistently poor than other types of families (Lokshin & Popkin, 1999). Furthermore, publications by the International Monetary Fund note that benefits in the country are low, with family allowance covering an average of 12% of the subsistence minimum for children (Sederlof, 2000). In other words, if it is in fact the financial need which drives the repartnering process, we should see that divorcees with children are most likely to repartner in Romania and Russia, followed by Germany, Norway, and finally, France.

Another factor which is important to consider is how common and accepted divorce is in the country. The argument here is that in states with particularly low divorce rates, divorced parents are even less attractive on the remarriage market because of the possible stigma associated with divorce. Therefore, people in these marriage markets likely tend to search for partners who closely resemble never before married individuals (i.e., with few ties to their previous marriage; Meggliolaro et al., 2008). The net divorce rates (number of divorces per 1,000 married women) for the 1990 – 2000 period indicate that divorce is most common in Russia (17.95), followed by Norway (11.80), France (9.19), Germany (6.41), and finally, Romania (5.57; Kalmijn, 2007). In light of these differences, we would to expect that divorced parents are least attractive to potential new partners in Romania, followed by Germany, France, Norway, and finally Russia.

The final country level characteristic which we consider here is the country's childcare system. Our reasoning is that in countries with high childcare provisions, divorced parents (and especially those with resident children) will have more opportunities to repartner both via higher labor market participation and by having more leisure time to meet potential partners. The existing provisions in France and Norway aim at almost full coverage of the needs for formal childcare for children over the age of three, with some difficulties to meet the demand for care of younger children (European Commission, 2009). Though these countries are similar with respect to the availability of formal childcare, the attitudes towards using these services differ somewhat. Qualitative work shows that the attitudes towards institutionalized childcare in France, including for three-four month old babies, are rather favorable (European Commission, 2009). In Norway, however, the "informal norms imply that 'good parents' do not fully use the hours of the contracted services" for very young children (European Commission, 2009, p.54) and according to public statements from the Norwegian Children's Ombudsman, "children should not spend too many hours in day care" (European Commission, 2009, p.52). For Germany, the inability to meet the demand for childcare is higher with some reports stating that, "the insufficient provision of formal childcare obstructs participation in the labour market" (European Commission, 2009, p.40). Furthermore, there is less uniformity in German attitudes towards using childcare, with the majority of parents becoming interested in public services only once the child turns two years old (European Commission, 2009). In Romania, both the level of coverage and the quality of the provided services are found to be rather low (European Commission, 2009). This is also reflected in finding that the average enrolment rate of children under the age of three in formal childcare is lower in Romania than in Germany (OECD, 2011a). It is however, important to note here, that the use of informal childcare arrangements in Romania is among the highest in Europe (OECD, 2011b) thus, possibly compensating for the lack of formal childcare facilities. For the Russian Federation, the situation changed dramatically after the 1991 transition. Whereas in the 1980s about 70% of children between the ages of one and six were registered in public (and heavily state subsidized) childcare facilities, that proportion dropped by more than 50% by the mid-1990s due to the sudden increase in costs (Rieck, 2006). Unfortunately, studies on childcare attitudes are not available for Romania and Russia. In summary, the childcare system appears to be of highest quality and availability in France and Norway, followed by Germany, Romania, and Russia.

As can be seen from this short overview, some characteristics within a country might work to facilitate the repartnering process, whereas others might impede it. Therefore, the comparative goal of this paper is framed as largely explorative. In our work, we also control for several important repartnering differentials: duration of the marital union, current age, and the respondent's educational level (as proxy for socioeconomic status). Previous work has already shown that these can have gender-specific effects on the likelihood to repartner (e.g., Wu et al., 2005). We also introduced a control for the historical time in which the respondents separated from their divorce partners (i.e., *separation cohort*). Evidence suggests that there are gender-specific historical trends in the likelihood to repartner, with women currently "catching up" to men in their repartnering chances (de Graaf et al., 2003).

5 Data and Measures

In order to address our research questions, we use data from the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS; United Nations, 2005). The GGS is an initiative of the Generations and Gender Programme (GGP), instigated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The main aim of the programme is to aid the understanding of social and demographic changes and of the factors that influence these developments, with a strong focus on relationships between children and parents (*generations*) and between partners (*gender*) (Macura, 2002). A detailed description of the survey's design, scope, and aims can be found in Vikat et al. (2007).

The GGS is designed as a panel study of nationally representative samples of men and women, between the ages of 18 and 79, in each of the participating developed (mainly) European countries. In this paper, we focus on the first of the three planned data collections which was conducted in 2005 in France, Germany, and Romania, 2004 in Russia, and in 2007/2008 in Norway. This first wave includes retrospective information on the fertility and partnership histories of the participants collected during structured face-to-face interviews in the respondents' homes. The original sample sizes for the five countries are displayed in Table 1. More information about the data collection and characteristics of the national samples can be found in the 2005 publication of the United Nations.

The data collection on partnerships was restricted to coresidential unions where the partners were married or lived in the same household for at least three months (Vikat et al., 2007). We select respondents who reported that a previous relationship ended in divorce (n = 2,322 for Norway or 15.6% of the original sample, n = 1,189 for France or 11.4% of the original sample, n = 995 for Germany or 9.9% of the original sample, n = 865 for Romania or 7.2% of the original sample size, and n = 2,156 for Russia or 19.1% of the original sample). Though the participants could report multiple divorces, we focus on the first one and on the self-reported *year of separation* from the ex-partner. We do not to consider the actual year of divorce because the amount of time between split-up and divorce can vary greatly between countries as a result of the corresponding legal regulations. Therefore, and in agreement with previous research, we consider the date of separation to be a more meaningful definition of relationship disruption than the date of divorce (Bumpass et al., 1990).

In our work, the dependent event of interest is the self-reported *start of cohabitation with a new partner* after the separation. As mentioned earlier, this cohabitation had to be at least three months long to be recorded and we do not make a distinction between the cohabitations which resulted in a marriage and those which did not. For some of the respondents these partnerships were still ongoing whereas for others, they were dissolved by the time of the interview. We exclude the respondents who reported that they cohabited with a partner after the separation but could not remember the year in which they moved in with their new partner (n = 17 for Norway;

n = 3 for France; *n* = 31 for Germany, *n* = 0 for Romania, and *n* = 13 for Russia). Moreover, we exclude all respondents for whom the time from separation to a new cohabitation had a negative or zero duration. The additionally performed checks of these zero durations demonstrated that in a large majority of the cases, there were only a few of months between separation and new cohabitation (findings not displayed here but available upon request). In other words, it is likely that for these respondents the marital dissolution was precipitated by the start of another romantic relationship. In this case, we cannot consider the respondents to have actually been on the "repartnering market" after separation. Therefore, we focus only on the respondents who had at least one calendar year between separation and start of new cohabitation.

For each of the reported partnerships, the respondents were also asked if they had *any children with the ex-partner* (answer categories, yes / no). If they did, they were then asked with whom these shared children stayed after the separation. The respondents could choose between nine options for *children's residence* (e.g., 1 = "with me", 2 = "with my ex-partner", 3 = "with both of us on a time-shared basis", 4 = "with relatives"). Due to the small *n*'s in some categories, we construct a new variable where 0 = "no children from ex-partner", 1 = "children stay with respondent", 2 = "children stay with ex-partner", 3 = "joint custody", and 4 = "other".

In addition to this information about the children from the ex-partner, we also have information about the birth years of all biological children of the respondent. Based on these and the year of separation from the ex-partner, we calculate *the age of the youngest child at the time of separation*.

Additionally to these main variables of interest, we control for the *marriage duration* of the union which ended in divorce. This is calculated based on the self-reported year of marriage (or start of cohabitation if the year of marriage was not available) and the year of separation. We also incorporate *the current age of the respondents* in our models as a way to control for possible age effects on the likelihood to repartner. Furthermore, we control for the respondents' educational level by calculating their *highest achieved educational rank* with respect to the education level of the rest of the participants in that country. In other words, each respondent is assigned a proportional score recording the fraction of people in the sample at or below his / her highest educational level. In the cases when we perform analyses split by gender, we control for the respondent's educational rank with respect to the rest of the males or females in the sample (i.e., *gender specific educational rank*). Finally, we control for the respondent's "*separation cohort*". This variable is constructed by subtracting the earliest year of separation within the sample from the respondent's own year of separation and dividing the product by 10. In other words, the persons who separated longest ago have a value of 0 and a one unit increase on this continuous variable presents a 10-year more recent separation. The final samples for our models are: 2,061 for Norway (57.8% female), 1,029 for France (60.7% female), 810 for Germany (59.8% female), 753 for Romania (56.4% female), and 1,855 for Russia (71.2% female). As can be seen, women are overrepresented in all five samples.

6 Analytical approach

We use discrete-time event-history analysis (Yamaguchi, 1991) to examine gender differences in repartnering after marital dissolution and the effect of children on one's repartnering chances. Discrete-time models are a good approximation of continuous time models if the time intervals are not too large. For this work, we use years as intervals. Duration dependency was accounted for by introducing seven interval dummies in our models (for more information on the specific periods, see Tables 2 and 3). This approach is chosen as most flexible and because it does not require from us to make assumptions about the shape of the hazard.

We estimate five models, of which three are split by gender. All models are estimated with a logistic regression for the probability to start cohabiting with a new partner in a given year, conditional on still being single the year before. To estimate these models, we construct a person-year file that contains records for each individual for each year, starting with the year of separation and ending with the year in which the person started living with a new partner or, in case the person remained single the entire time, the year of survey. All models include the respondent's current age (i.e., time-varying), educational rank, separation cohort, and duration of marriage. Due to our sample sizes, we also discuss findings which are significant at the $p < .10$ level.

7 Results

Table 1 provides detailed information about the characteristics of our five national samples. As can be seen in that table, in most countries (with the exception of Romania), the majority of the divorced participants had a cohabiting relationship after the separation (from 53.1% in Germany to 58.1% in Norway). The shortest mean duration between separation and new cohabitation was reported in France (4.71 years, *SD* = 4.74) and the longest – in Norway (5.01, *SD* = 4.59; difference not statistically significant). For all five countries, the vast majority of the respondents had children with their partner at the time of the marital separation (from 74.0% in Romania to 84.9% in Norway). It is important to note that these numbers include both children below and above the age of 18. With respect to the children's residence after the marital separation, Table 1 shows that in all five countries, it was predominantly the female respondents who identified that the children stayed with them after the separation.

We now turn our attention to the five event history models which we estimated. In Model 1, we focused on the effect of gender on the probability to repartner (findings displayed in Table 2). Model 2 was identical to Model 1 but was estimated only for the respondents without children from the ex-partner (findings displayed in Table 3). If the effect of gender disappeared in this second model, we could assume that children were the main barrier to repartnering. As Table 2 shows and in line with previous empirical findings, women were significantly less likely to repartner after a separation in all five countries. The largest gender gap was observed in Russia where the chances of new cohabitation were 47.3% (calculated as (exp(b) – 1) *100)) lower for women than for men. The smallest gender gap was observed in Germany where the chances were 22.1% lower for women than for men. However, as can be seen in Table 3, when we ran the same models only for the participants without children from the ex-partner, we found that in France, Germany, and Russia, women no longer had lower chances to repartner than men. The two exceptions were Norway and Romania, where women still had respectively 36.2% and 31.6% (compared to 43.6% and 41.3% respectively in the first model) lower chances than men to enter a cohabiting union after separation. The results from this second model suggest that in most countries, children are indeed an important contributor to the gender gap in repartnering. In Norway and Romania, however, having children plays a smaller role in the previously documented gender gap. In the subsequent models, we investigated this “children as barrier” effect further.

In Model 3 we assessed the effect of having children on the chances to repartner, separately for the two genders, ignoring for the moment where the children live. As can be seen in Table 4, in all countries except Norway, having children was detrimental to women's but not to men's chances to repartner. The size of this effect ranged from 26.7% lower chances for women than for men in Germany to 38.1% lower odds in France. For the men in most countries, having children with the ex-partner did not significantly affect the likelihood to repartner. In Norway, however, children decreased both women's (by 29.5%) and men's (by 30.9%) chances to repartner compared to divorced participants without children from their ex-partners. In other words, we do not see evidence in any of the countries for a positive effect of children for men's chances to repartner. An additionally performed check demonstrated that the children effect on repartnering differed significantly between men and women for France ($p < .10$) and Russia ($p < .05$).

In Table 4, we can also see the effects that the control variables had on men's and women's likelihood to repartner. As men's educational rank increased, so did their chance to repartner in Norway and France. However, women's educational rank had no effect in these countries. Conversely, in Germany, an increase in one's educational rank had a positive effect on the likelihood to repartner for women but not for men. These differences between men and women were only significant in France ($p = .05$). In nearly all countries, as the respondents aged, their chances to repartner decreased significantly. The only exception was the case of Romanian men for whom age did not affect this likelihood. For all countries, the effect of current age was stronger for women than for men and this difference between the genders was significant ($p < .05$) everywhere except in France. This finding indicated strong age discrimination for women which poses an additional handicap on the repartnering market, next to the effect of children.

In two of the five countries, Norway and France, we found evidence that women's chances to repartner have been improving in the past few decades. For Norway, a 10-year more recent separation improved women's chances to repartner by 15% whereas in France, this increase was 13.9%. This effect was not found for the men which suggests that women in these countries have been narrowing the gender gap in repartnering chances. In Romania, however, we saw that the separation cohort had a negative effect on men's chances to enter a cohabiting union, decreasing it by 16.5%. The observed differences in the cohort effect between men and women were not significant for any of the three countries. Finally, marriage duration had an almost consistent positive effect on the likelihood to enter a cohabiting union after separation. The only exception were Romanian men for whom an increase of one year in their marriage duration, decreased their chances to repartner by 3.9%. For Romanian women however, the opposite effect was found – their chances increased by 5.1%. This difference between the two genders was not significant.

In Model 4 we focused on how children's residence can affect the likelihood to repartner, separately for men and women. Due to the fact that in some countries the *n* was too small for some of the residential categories (e.g., only eight women in Russia said that the children stayed with their ex-partner after separation), the categories with fewer than 40 cases for the specific country were dropped from the model. The only country for which we had enough cases in each residential category for both men and women was Norway. For the rest of the countries, we had to omit some of the residence dummies from the analyses. Therefore, the models are not directly comparable. We first discuss our findings for France, Germany, Romania, and Russia, and then discuss Norway separately.

As can be seen in Table 5, women's chances to repartner were significantly and negatively affected by having resident children. This effect ranged from 40.5% lower chances to repartner for women with resident children compared to childless women in Romania to 25.9% lower chances in Germany. In contrast, when men had resident children after the separation, their likelihood to repartner was not affected. Men's chances to repartner were also not significantly affected by having children who stayed with the ex-partner. In short, it appeared that women's likelihood to repartner was hurt by resident children, whereas men's chances were not affected by having children with the ex-partner.

We now present our findings for Norway. Just like in the other four countries, having resident children decreased women's odds to repartner but not men's. In contrast to the previously outlined results, however, we found that nonresident children in Norway decreased men's likelihood to repartner by 31.6%. Women's chances on the other hand, were positively but not significantly affected by having children stay with the ex-partner. This difference between men and women was not significant. As for joint custody, our findings indicated that it was detrimental to both men's (decreasing it by 31.6%) and women's (decreasing it by 35.6%) chances to repartner. In other words, in Norway women's chances to repartner were hurt when the children were residing with them at least part-time whereas men's chances to repartner were decreased by children who stayed with their mothers at least part-time. We come back to this in the conclusion.

In Model 5, we investigated the effect of the youngest child's age at separation, separately for men and women. In this model, three variables related to the age of the youngest child were utilized: a time-varying variable for the current age of the youngest child, a time-varying dummy denoting whether the child was 18 or older in that year (0 = younger than 18, 1 = 18 or older), and an interaction between these two variables. This approach allowed us to assess whether the effect of the youngest child's age changed once that child reached the age of majority. As can be seen in Table 6, when the child's age mattered, it mostly did so for the women in the respective country. We see that in France and Russia, for each year that the youngest child aged, women's chances to repartner increased by 8.3% but that is only true before the child turns 18. When the youngest child turned 18, women's chances to enter a new cohabiting union in these two countries improved substantially (increasing about five fold in France and four times in Russia). After this turning point, however, we see that the youngest child's age was no longer important for the chances to repartner.

The findings are somewhat different for Norway. Foremost, we see that the youngest child's age mattered both for men's and women's chances to repartner but only once the child turned 18 and not before that. At this transition the chances for Norwegian men and women to enter a new cohabiting union increased substantially. After it however, for each year which the youngest child aged, men's likelihood to repartner dropped by 5.8% and women's – by 6.8%.

8 Discussion

The main aim of this work was to re-examine the effect children can have on men's and women's chances to repartner after divorce and to expand on previous findings by presenting comparable results for five European countries which differ substantially in their institutional contexts (Norway, France, Germany, Romania, and Russia). In addition to testing the possible "fatherhood" and "motherhood" effects, we also considered how the custodial arrangements and the child's age could affect the likelihood to enter into a new cohabiting union for men and women. Several noteworthy findings emerged from our work. In the subsequent sections, we will first address the findings with respect to the effect of children on repartnering and will then discuss the observed country differences and similarities.

Foremost, our analyses revealed that frequently children can indeed be seen as women's main barrier on the repartnering market. In line with our expectations and ample evidence from earlier works on both European and North American samples (e.g., Coleman et al., 2000; de Graaf et al., 2003; Meggliolaro et al., 2007; Skew et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2005), we found that women were less likely to repartner after divorce than men. However, our findings from the analyses for childless divorcees did not provide such overwhelming evidence for the existence of a gender gap in repartnering. We found that in three of the five countries (with the exception of Norway and Romania) women without children were *not* less likely to repartner than men without children. In other words, children could indeed be seen as women's main barrier on the repartnering market in these countries.

Our findings with respect to possible "parenthood" effects on repartnering also demonstrated that women's chances to enter a new cohabiting union were damaged by their motherhood status. Men's likelihood to repartner, however, was not affected by fatherhood in almost any of the countries (with the exception of Norway where it decreased). A few conclusions can be drawn based on this finding. It has been suggested that people's initiation of a new union can be guided by several factors – the need to repartner, the attractiveness to potential partners, and the opportunity to meet and mate with such partners (Becker, 1991; de Graaf et al., 2003; Goldscheider et al., 1986; Oppenheimer, 1988). In our work, we do not find support for the positive effect which the need argument implies. Though women's economic situation in particular has been shown to be adversely affected by divorce (e.g., Poortman, 2000), an effect possibly offset by remarriage (Dewilde et al., 2008), we did not find that women with children were more likely to repartner than women without children. In fact, women with children had even *lower* chances to repartner than women without children. The other important point to address here relates to the previously reported mixed findings about the effect of parenthood on men's likelihood to repartner. Whereas some researchers have established a positive effect of fatherhood on men's likelihood to repartner (e.g., Bernhardt et al., 2002; Stewart et al., 2003; Wu et al., 2005), others have not found this effect (e.g., de Graaf et al., 2003; Poortman, 2007). Our findings are in line with the latter group of researchers. In our work, we saw that men's chances to repartner were not improved by fatherhood and were even damaged in Norway. Though we did not directly test the mechanisms underlying the link between parenthood and repartnering, our subsequent analyses with respect to the custodial arrangements and child's age shed some light on the factors which could account for the established negative effect.

In all countries, we found that coresidential children damaged women's but not men's chances to enter a new cohabiting union. The explanation of this effect can likely be found in the previously outlined "opportunities to repartner" argument. Resident children are likely to reduce the time and energy that custodial parents can spend on socializing with potential new partners (Koo et al., 1984), irrespective of the parent's gender. However, the impact of parenthood on employment has been found to be rather gender-specific with fathers working more than non-fathers, whereas mothers have lower employment rates than non-mothers (European Commission, 2009). Previous empirical work has also demonstrated that though a variety of employment patterns during parenthood exist, only a small percentage of mothers remain continuously employed before and after childbirth (e.g., Hynes & Clarkberg, 2005). As the work place has been shown to play an important role in meeting new partners (de Graaf et al., 2003), women with resident children likely have even more strictly restricted opportunities to meet new partners than men with resident children. When the children stayed with their father, however, mothers' chances to repartner were not lower than those for non-mothers. The story was somewhat different for fathers. Coresidential children did not hurt men's chances to repartner but when the children stayed with their mother, fathers had lower likelihood to enter a new cohabiting union than non-fathers. This finding likely points to a certain decrease in attractiveness on the repartnering market. The fact that the children stay primarily with their mother does not necessarily exclude paternal involvement in their lives. In other words, there is still a stronger bond between the ex-partners (e.g., the father has to see his children at the ex-partner's home). The finding about joint custody and parents' repartnering also points in this direction. We saw that shared custody reduced both parents' chances to enter into a new cohabiting union. This strong bond between the ex-partners probably decreased both fathers' and mothers' attractiveness to potential new partners.

Our final noteworthy finding with respect to the "child effect" on repartnering concerns the significance of the child's age. Our analyses indicated that when the child's age mattered, it mostly did so for the mothers (and not the fathers) in our study. This is not necessarily a surprising result, however, as most children stayed with their mothers and not fathers after the marital dissolution. In most cases, we saw that as the child, youngest at time of separation, aged, women's chances to repartner improved. This is in line with previous findings that young children are particularly likely to hurt parents' repartnering chances (e.g., Skew et al, 2009). In our work, we also saw that this likelihood increased substantially once the child reached the age of majority and likely also moved out from the parental home. After this transition, however, the child's age no longer mattered (except in Norway, where it had a negative effect on repartnering).

In our work, we were able to present more or less comparable findings from five rather distinct in their institutional contexts European countries. Yet, the story which emerged was dominated by similarities in the effects rather than differences. In most countries, children were women's main barrier on the repartnering market, parenthood affected women's but not men's chances to repartner, coresidential children decreased mothers' but not fathers' likelihood to enter a new cohabiting union, and finally, as children aged, women's chances to repartner improved. Two exceptions emerged –Romania and Norway. In Romania, childless women still had a lower likelihood to repartner than childless men. As divorce rates in this country are rather low compared to the rest of the European continent (Kalmijn, 2007), the stigma associated with separated women repartnering might be especially strong there. The similar finding for Norway, however, is somewhat of a puzzle. It is possible that here we are discussing a rather select sample of women. As we saw, the age at separation from first marital partner was higher in Norway than in the rest of the countries. These somewhat older, childless women might differ substantially from childless women in the rest of the countries in other aspects, which we were, unfortunately, unable to account for in our study. Additionally, we found that parenthood was detrimental to both men's and women's chances to repartner in Norway. This might be accounted for by Norwegian men's greater involvement in their children's lives. Assessments of time-spending patterns of Europeans have shown that men in Norway spend more time with their children per day than men in France or Germany, for example (European Commission, 2004). This might especially pose a problem on the repartnering market if the children stay with their mother after the separation.

STILL TO BE ADDED TO THE DISCUSSION: ADDITIONAL POINTS ON NORWAY AND LIMITATIONS

- No direct test of any of the suggested mechanisms;

- Speculation about possible country differences but no direct indicators taken into account; analyses ran separately as a multilevel approach would be impossible with only five countries;
- Findings about joint custody and differences between mothers' and fathers' repartnering when the child stayed with the ex-partner are based primarily on Norway; no other country had a sufficient number of cases to examine all of the custodial scenarios.

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Table 1.
Overview of the available data for the five countries of interest

	Norway	France	Germany	Romania	Russia
Original sample size	14,881	10,079	10,017	11,986	11,261
% female	50.7%	56.6%	54.0%	50.1%	62.5%
Mean age at interview (*SD*)	46.9 (16.0)	47.4 (16.5)	47.71 (16.36)	49.53 (16.26)	46.81 (16.73)
Final sample for analysis	2,061	1,029	810	753	1,855
% female	57.8%	60.7%	59.8%	56.4%	71.2%
Mean duration of marriage (SD)	12.41 (8.84)	12.12 (8.8)	11.19 (8.3)	10.9 (8.0)	8.43 (7.15)
Mean age at separation (*SD*)	36.84 (9.37)	35.39 (9.12)	35.28 (9.44)	34.17 (8.92)	30.86 (8.26)
Of the ever divorced					
Had children with ex-partner	1,750 (84.9%)	858 (83.4%)	630 (77.9%)	557 (74.0%)	1,539 (83.0%)
Of which % female	57.5%	62.5%	61.8%	57.6%	73.1%
Children from ex-partner stayed with					
Respondent (of which % female)	858 (84.0%)	536 (86.9%)	372 (90.6%)	356 (80.1%)	1,118 (96.3%)
Ex-partner (of which % female)	431 (10.7%)	225 (11.6%)	179 (7.3%)	161 (8.7%)	341 (2.35%)
Joint custody (of which % female)	220 (44.5%)	42 (35.7%)	13 (15.4%)	11 (27.3%)	13 (7.69%)
Another arrangement (of which % female)	241 (58.9%)	55 (52.7%)	65 (56.9%)	29 (65.5%)	67 (58.2%)
For the ever divorced					
Mean age of youngest bio child at split up (*SD*)	9.45 (7.34)	8.83 (7.41)	8.94 (7.46)	8.56 (7.0)	6.93 (6.29)
Of the ever divorced					
Repartnered	1,198 (58.1%)	577 (56.1%)	430 (53.1%)	328 (43.6%)	1,021 (55.0%)
Of which % female	53.8%	58.9%	57.2%	50.6%	65.9%
Average number of years to repartnering (*SD*)	5.01 (4.59)	4.71 (4.74)	4.97 (5.47)	4.91 (5.02)	4.88 (4.80)

Table 2.

Repartnering of Separated Individuals: Event-History Analysis of Gender Differences in Repartnering

	Norway (NO) *B* (*SE*)	France (FR) *B* (*SE*)	Germany (DE) *B* (*SE*)	Romania (RO) *B* (*SE*)	Russia (RU) *B* (*SE*)
Female	−0.572***	−0.393***	−0.252*	−0.532***	−0.642***
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Educational rank	0.252*	0.442**	0.462*	−0.043	0.126
	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.13)
Current age	−0.094***	−0.078***	−0.068***	−0.060***	−0.095***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Separation cohort	0.100**	0.055	0.002	−0.064	−0.034
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Marriage duration	0.040***	0.027*	0.024+	−0.011	0.035**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Ref. = One year without partner					
Two to three years	0.113	0.017	−0.386**	−0.022	−0.257**
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.10)
Four to five years	0.065	−0.262+	−0.662***	−0.280	−0.394***
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.12)
Six to seven years	−0.133	−0.757***	−0.582**	−0.383+	−0.357**
	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.14)
Eight to nine years	0.044	−0.360+	−1.407***	−0.406	−0.363*
	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.16)
Ten to eleven years	−0.050	−0.603*	−0.686*	−1.227**	−0.297
	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.38)	(0.19)
Over 11 years	0.030	−0.706**	−1.107***	−1.282***	−0.581**
	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.34)	(0.20)
Constant	0.653**	0.283	0.242	0.313	1.239***
	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.39)	(0.26)

Note. $^{+}p < .10$, $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$

Table 3.

Repartnering of Separated Individuals without Children from the Ex-Partner: Event-History Analysis of Gender Differences in Repartnering

	Norway (NO) *B* (*SE*)	France (FR) *B* (*SE*)	Germany (DE) *B* (*SE*)	Romania (RO) *B* (*SE*)	Russia (RU) *B* (*SE*)
Female	−0.454**	−0.040	−0.004	−0.377+	−0.185
	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.17)
Educational rank	0.539*	0.719+	0.339	0.040	−0.640*
	(0.27)	(0.38)	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.30)
Current age	−0.081***	−0.072***	−0.072***	−0.053*	−0.096***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Separation cohort	0.030	0.037	0.125	−0.052	−0.029
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Marriage duration	0.004	0.007	0.030	−0.004	0.055*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Ref. = One year without partner					
Two to three years	−0.245	−0.025	0.101	0.165	−0.230
	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.21)
Four to five years	−0.222	0.019	−0.696+	−0.167	−0.765**
	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.28)
Six to seven years	−0.328	−0.766+	−0.577	−0.122	−0.281
	(0.30)	(0.46)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.29)
Eight to nine years	−0.491	−0.260	−0.827	−0.270	−1.387**
	(0.39)	(0.45)	(0.53)	(0.47)	(0.50)
Ten to eleven years	0.265	−0.176	0.211	−1.017	−0.671
	(0.38)	(0.52)	(0.47)	(0.67)	(0.45)
Over eleven years	−1.141*	−0.694	−1.489*	−1.114*	−0.797+
	(0.49)	(0.54)	(0.63)	(0.57)	(0.44)
Constant	0.970*	0.076	−0.139	−0.158	1.647**
	(0.47)	(0.64)	(0.63)	(0.60)	(0.51)

Note. $^{+}p < .10$, $*p < .05$, $**p < .01$, $***p < .001$

Table 4.

Repartnering of Separated Individuals: Event-History Analysis of the Effect of Children on Repartnering, Split by Gender

	NO_male *B* (*SE*)	NO_fem *B* (*SE*)	FR_male *B* (*SE*)	FR_fem *B* (*SE*)	DE_male *B* (*SE*)	DE_fem *B* (*SE*)	RO_male *B* (*SE*)	RO_fem *B* (*SE*)	RU_male *B* (*SE*)	RU_fem *B* (*SE*)
Ref. = No children with ex-partner										
Has children	−0.37**	−0.35**	−0.14	−0.48**	−0.21	−0.31+	−0.09	−0.46*	−0.09	−0.42**
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Ed rank w/in gender	0.35*	0.13	0.94**	0.14	0.33	0.47+	0.43	−0.42	−0.18	0.19
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.28)	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.22)	(0.17)
Current age	−0.09**	−0.10**	−0.07**	−0.09**	−0.06**	−0.08**	−0.02	−0.13**	−0.06**	−0.12**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Separation cohort	0.04	0.14**	−0.07	0.13*	−0.00	0.00	−0.18*	0.09	−0.09	−0.00
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Duration of mar	0.06**	0.04**	0.04+	0.03+	0.04*	0.02	−0.04+	0.05+	0.04*	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Ref. = Interval 1										
Interval 2	0.15	0.10	0.00	0.04	−0.42*	−0.33+	−0.00	0.05	−0.26+	−0.23+
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Interval 3	0.13	0.04	−0.13	−0.32	−0.82**	−0.48*	−0.26	−0.10	−0.78**	−0.17
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.21)	(0.14)
Interval 4	−0.14	−0.07	−1.01**	−0.56*	−0.87**	−0.30	−0.17	−0.41	−0.67**	−0.15
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.33)	(0.25)	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.36)	(0.24)	(0.17)
Interval 5	0.05	0.11	−0.64+	−0.13	−1.46**	−1.26**	−0.41	−0.06	−0.78**	−0.09
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.35)	(0.26)	(0.43)	(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.28)	(0.20)
Interval 6	0.15	−0.14	−0.60	−0.52	−0.51	−0.76+	−1.29*	−0.77	−1.21**	0.16
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.40)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.52)	(0.59)	(0.39)	(0.22)
Interval 7	−0.19	0.30	−1.03*	−0.36	−1.35**	−0.72*	−2.12**	0.00	−0.91**	−0.26
	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.41)	(0.33)	(0.41)	(0.37)	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.34)	(0.25)
Constant	0.70*	0.63*	0.07	0.50	0.01	0.68	−0.82	1.49**	0.64	1.32**
	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.54)	(0.39)	(0.49)	(0.46)	(0.58)	(0.55)	(0.47)	(0.31)

Note. $^{+}p < .10$, $*p < .05$, $**p < .01$

Table 5.

Repartnering of Separated Individuals: Event-History Analysis of the Effect of Children's Residence on Repartnering, Split by Gender

	NO_male *B* (*SE*)	NO_fem *B* (*SE*)	FR_male *B* (*SE*)	FR_fem *B* (*SE*)	DE_male *B* (*SE*)	DE_fem *B* (*SE*)	RO_male *B* (*SE*)	RO_fem *B* (*SE*)	RU_male *B* (*SE*)	RU_fem *B* (*SE*)
Ref. = no children										
Child with R	−0.29	−0.35**	−0.11	−0.48**	--	−0.30+	−0.32	−0.52**	−0.43	−0.42**
	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.16)		(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.12)
Child with partner	−0.38**	0.27	−0.16	--	−0.10	--	0.00	--	−0.05	--
	(0.14)	(0.24)	(0.19)		(0.19)		(0.19)		(0.15)	
Shared	−0.38*	−0.44*	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
	(0.18)	(0.20)								
Other	−0.28	0.10	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
	(0.23)	(0.22)								
Ed rank w/in gender	0.35*	0.11	0.85**	0.14	0.17	0.50+	0.42	−0.44	−0.25	0.15
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.30)	(0.23)	(0.36)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.23)	(0.17)
Current age	−0.09**	−0.10**	−0.07**	−0.10**	−0.04*	−0.08**	−0.02	−0.14**	−0.05**	−0.12**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Separation cohort	0.05	0.15**	−0.06	0.15**	0.01	0.02	−0.16+	0.11	−0.08	−0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Duration of mar	0.06**	0.03*	0.03+	0.03+	0.03	0.02	−0.03	0.06+	0.03+	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Ref. = Interval 1										
Interval 2	0.15	0.10	−0.15	0.13	−0.58*	−0.30	−0.04	0.14	−0.29+	−0.23+
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Interval 3	0.13	0.05	−0.21	−0.13	−0.87**	−0.44+	−0.34	0.02	−0.78**	−0.16
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.28)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.14)
Interval 4	−0.13	−0.06	−1.04**	−0.42	−1.01**	−0.33	−0.19	−0.18	−0.70**	−0.11
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.35)	(0.27)	(0.34)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.24)	(0.17)
Interval 5	0.05	0.12	−0.67+	0.11	−1.60**	−1.19**	−0.39	0.00	−1.01**	−0.10
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.36)	(0.27)	(0.47)	(0.41)	(0.36)	(0.43)	(0.31)	(0.20)
Interval 6	0.16	−0.13	−0.66	−0.22	−0.82*	−0.70+	−1.26*	−0.51	−1.21**	0.17
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.42)	(0.35)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.53)	(0.60)	(0.39)	(0.23)
Interval 7	−0.18	0.32	−1.06*	−0.10	−1.61**	−0.70+	−2.20**	0.26	−1.07**	−0.24
	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.43)	(0.35)	(0.43)	(0.38)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.35)	(0.26)
Constant	0.72*	0.67*	0.20	0.59	−0.29	0.47	−0.79	1.65**	0.50	1.33**
	(0.34)	(0.29)	(0.56)	(0.41)	(0.52)	(0.47)	(0.59)	(0.58)	(0.48)	(0.32)

Note. R = respondent; $^{+}p < .10$, $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$

Table 6.

Repartnering of Separated Individuals: Event-History Analysis of the Effect of Youngest Child's Age on Repartnering, Split by Gender

	NO_male	NO_fem	FR_male	FR_fem	DE_male	DE_fem	RO_male	RO_fem	RU_male	RU_fem
	B (*SE*)	*B* (*SE*)	*B* (*SE*)	*B* (*SE*)	*B* (*SE*)	*B* (*SE*)	*B* (*SE*)	*B* (*SE*)	*B* (*SE*)	*B* (*SE*)
Curr age of yngest	0.01	0.03	−0.02	0.08**	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.03	−0.02	0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Ref. = the youngest is a minor										
The yngest is >= 18	1.32*	1.76**	0.52	1.81*	0.34	1.42	−1.33	−1.10	−0.22	1.66*
	(0.56)	(0.49)	(0.91)	(0.74)	(0.93)	(0.91)	(1.45)	(1.27)	(1.02)	(0.70)
Interaction between										
curr age of yngest	−0.06*	−0.07**	−0.03	−0.09*	−0.01	−0.05	0.03	0.05	0.01	−0.09**
* > 18 dummy	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Ed rank w/in gender	0.33+	0.12	0.96**	−0.13	0.44	0.45	0.41	−0.21	0.08	0.32+
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.33)	(0.25)	(0.38)	(0.31)	(0.39)	(0.43)	(0.27)	(0.18)
Current age	−0.09**	−0.11**	−0.06**	−0.11**	−0.05*	−0.08**	−0.02	−0.19**	−0.06**	−0.13**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Separation cohort	0.06	0.17**	−0.16+	0.18**	−0.09	−0.04	−0.23*	0.07	−0.11	−0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Duration of mar	0.06**	0.02+	0.06*	0.00	0.03	0.00	−0.07*	0.09*	0.05*	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ref. = Interval 1										
Interval 2	0.25+	0.18	0.16	−0.05	−0.68**	−0.47*	−0.18	−0.07	−0.31	−0.24+
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.19)	(0.14)
Interval 3	0.14	0.04	−0.05	−0.67**	−0.92**	−0.44+	−0.41	−0.19	−0.75**	−0.21
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.26)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.26)	(0.17)
Interval 4	−0.08	−0.20	−0.82*	−0.86**	−1.10**	−0.24	−0.44	−0.89+	−0.60+	−0.46*
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.40)	(0.28)	(0.39)	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.52)	(0.31)	(0.21)
Interval 5	0.14	0.00	−0.50	−0.57+	−1.87**	−1.22**	−0.84+	−0.12	−0.39	−0.36
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.45)	(0.30)	(0.58)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.53)	(0.36)	(0.25)
Interval 6	−0.01	−0.49	−0.14	−1.35**	−0.73	−1.10*	−1.54*	−1.06	−0.86+	−0.27
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.48)	(0.43)	(0.47)	(0.51)	(0.64)	(0.85)	(0.50)	(0.29)
Interval 7	−0.06	0.13	−0.77	−0.92*	−1.54**	−0.90+	−2.72**	−0.01	−0.71	−0.78*
	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.58)	(0.39)	(0.54)	(0.48)	(0.76)	(0.73)	(0.50)	(0.34)
Constant	0.19	0.36	−0.12	0.48	0.00	0.54	−0.39	2.23**	0.53	1.10**
	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.65)	(0.44)	(0.65)	(0.55)	(0.74)	(0.78)	(0.59)	(0.37)

Note. $^{+}p < .10$, $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$